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Dynamics of Investments in Young Children

The Dynamics
of Investments
in Young
Children
by Philip A. Trostel

Philip Trostel presents compelling evidence of the
importance of early investment in young children,
citing research demonstrating the economic and social
benefits of such investments. He suggests that the lack
of understanding of the cause-and-effect relationship
between early childhood experiences and later-life
consequences and a failure to conceptualize how
things might be done in new ways are both obstacles.
Trostel argues that investing in early childhood development benefits children for the rest of their lives,
benefits government with reduced spending in other
areas, and moreover is the “right thing to do.”
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We simply cannot
INTRODUCTION

I

n the mid 1960s, 123 three- and four-year-old
African-American children living in poverty were
selected for a pioneering study on the long-term effects
of high-quality preschooling. Almost half of those
children (58 of the 123) were randomly chosen to
participate in the High/Scope Perry Preschool program
in Ypsilanti, Michigan. The other half served as a
control group. Most (three-fourths) of those randomly
selected into the program attended the Perry Preschool
for two academic years, with the rest only attending
one year at age four. This preschool program consisted
of weekday 2.5-hour sessions taught in small groups
(there was an average of fewer than six children per
teacher) by a certified teacher with at least a bachelor’s
degree, and 1.5-hour weekly home visits and curriculum interaction with mothers. The annual cost per
child was about $11,300 in 2007 dollars. For further
information on the program and its consequences, see
Schweinhart et al. (2005).
Of the 123 children originally in the study, data
from all 116 still alive were collected when they
reached age 40 several years ago. The results are
nothing short of remarkable. Of the Perry Preschool
attendees (the treatment group), 65 percent had graduated from regular high school, compared to only 45
percent of those in the control group. Only 62 percent
of the control group was employed at age 40, compared
to 76 percent of the treatment group. Median annual
earnings at age 40 were about 36 percent higher for the
group participating in the enriched preschool program.
Moreover, 17 percent of the group not participating in
the program was incarcerated at age 40, compared to
six percent of those with the good fortune of being
selected into the high-quality preschool program. Even
survival to age 40 was evidently positively affected by
preschool participation (97 percent for the treatment
group compared to 92 percent for the control group).
Similarly, fewer of the treatment group had received
some form of social services by age 40, and fewer had
used illegal drugs and legal medications. Even after
taking the “time value of money” into account (i.e.,
discounting the benefits that occur after the up-front
cost), the value of some of the various benefits to the
participants and to society from participation in the

Perry Preschool program was
afford not to make
estimated to be more than nine
times greater than the cost of the
much greater investprogram.
Rather than emphasize
ments in laying the
the astounding payoff from the
Perry Preschool experiment, one
groundwork for
could just as easily emphasize
the tragic unfairness for those
successful lives for
with the random misfortune
of being in the control group.
our young children.
The children excluded from
the opportunity of a quality
preschool experience generally
suffered the consequences for
the rest of their lives. And, as if that were not bad
enough, the rest of society experienced the higher costs
of crime, incarceration, and welfare spending, and
lower tax revenues. Denying people opportunities to
create successful lives in the name of research is an
inexplicable injustice.
If only this inexplicable injustice were an isolated
incident. The real tragedy is that denying children
opportunities for success occurs on a much wider scale
right now here in Maine. Of course, the exclusion is not
in the name of research. It occurs because early childhood educational opportunities are perceived as being
too costly—especially now in these tight budgetary
times. What is truly costly, however, is status quo. We
simply cannot afford not to make much greater investments in laying the groundwork for successful lives for
our young children.
THE PAYOFF:
A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE RESEARCH

A

lthough the Perry Preschool study is the most
widely celebrated research on the benefits of early
childhood programs, it is not alone in demonstrating
astounding returns to early childhood programs. For
more in-depth reviews of the research briefly summarized below, see Currie (2001), Karoly Kilburn and
Cannon (2005), Cunha et al. (2006), and Blau and
Currie (2006).
The Abecedarian study is the other well-known
small-scale randomized trial involving young children
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and the collection of long-term longitudinal data. This
program provided full-day, year-round child care with
educational emphasis for 53 of 104 at-risk children
born in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, in the mid-1970s
(the remaining 51 served as a control group). Highquality child care was provided for the treatment group
from infancy until kindergarten at age five. The cumulative five-year cost was approximately $77,000 per
child in 2007 dollars (for further information on the
cost and benefits of this program, see Barnett and
Masse 2007). Followed through to age 21, the treated
group had significantly lower costs in K-12 education
(from less participation in special education and less
grade repetition), less smoking and illegal drug use,
higher rates of high school completion and college
attendance, and greater earnings potential. After
discounting the benefits occurring after participation
in the program, the value of some of the benefits was
estimated to be 2.5 times greater than the cost. The
benefit-cost ratio for the Abecedarian program is much
less than for the Perry Preschool program, primarily
because it did not measure any benefits from reduced
crime, which accounted for the majority of the
measured benefits from the earlier experiment.

Like all other investments, the costs of
early childhood programs are borne up
front, and the benefits accrue later.
The Chicago Child-Parent Center program begun
in 1967 is a high-quality half-day preschool program
for at-risk three- and four-year-olds. The annual cost
was about $7,500 per preschooler in 2007 dollars.
Instead of a small-scale randomized trial, it is a largescale project that has been evaluated by comparing the
outcomes of the participants to the outcomes of children with comparable socioeconomic backgrounds.
After discounting the post-preschool consequences,
the estimated value of the increase in earnings and the
decreases in the costs of crime, K-12 education, and
social insurance was almost eight times greater than
the cost of the program.
20 · Maine Policy Review · Summer/Fall 2009

The benefits of early childhood interventions were
also shown in the Prenatal/Early Infancy project, a
small-scale randomized trial of home visitation for lowincome, first-time, young and unmarried mothers in
Elmira, New York. In the late 1970s and early 1980s,
numerous and lengthy pre- and postnatal visits were
made by specially trained nurses in a mostly white,
rural area. The benefits have been estimated to be four
times the cost. However, the discounted benefit-cost
ratios of other home-visitation programs are generally
somewhat smaller than this, although they are still
greater than one.
Because of their scientific designs, the results of
these programs represent the most highly regarded
evidence on the effects of early childhood interventions.
Ironically, the academic jury is still out on Head Start, by
far the nation’s largest and best-known program for early
childhood education. This federally funded and locally
administered program currently serves almost a million
children (mostly four-year-olds) per year at an annual
cost of about $7 billion. Because of the lack of a control
group and the difficulties in constructing a comparison
group that is truly comparable, the evidence on the effectiveness of Head Start is mixed.
Overall, the literature generally indicates tremendous returns from targeted efforts to lay early groundwork for socially and economically successful lives.
Although more research on the topic narrowing the
precision of the estimates of the returns of early childhood interventions would be useful, it is quite clear
that the returns can be substantial. Moreover, much
of the return accrues to the general public (i.e., greater
tax revenues and lower costs of crime, incarceration,
public health, and welfare). Indeed, given the estimated
returns, if targeted investments in early childhood
development were private investment opportunities
capitalists would have scooped up those windfall-profit
opportunities long ago.
$100 BILLS LYING ON THE GROUND

I

nvestments in early childhood education are analogous to proverbial $100 bills lying on the ground
waiting to be picked up. To illustrate the principle that
investors seize clearly profitable private investment
opportunities, economists often joke that we do not
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see $100 bills just lying around because people would
obviously quickly scoop them up. For public investment opportunities, however, this principle often fails,
and public investment in our most precious asset is a
glaring example.
What makes this figurative $100-bills-left-on-theground instance particularly tragic is that not only is
investment in early childhood development the financially sensible thing to do, it is also the moral imperative. No reasonable argument can be made against
improving and equalizing opportunities for successful
lives, all else the same. In most instances there is a
severe tradeoff between equity and economic efficiency.
That is, attempting to equalize incomes through
various social-insurance and public-welfare programs
is typically extremely costly in terms of aggregate
prosperity. Arthur Okun famously described this harsh
tradeoff as a “leaky bucket” (Okun 1975). A lot of
income is spilled in passing income from the rich to
the poor. In the case of early childhood interventions,
though, the bucket is not only watertight, it actually
fills as greater opportunities are created for disadvantaged young children. Unlike perhaps any other egalitarian policy, there is no tradeoff between strict fiscal
stewardship and promoting greater equality.
The leading proponent of the idea above is James
Heckman, a Nobel laureate in economics. He recently
summarized the argument (Heckman 2008):
	A large body of research establishes that
investing in disadvantaged young children
improves the productivity of the economy and,
at the same time, reduces social and economic
inequality. In the world of politics where
“tradeoffs” are the rule, a policy of investing
in disadvantaged young children is rare. For
this policy, there is no tradeoff between equity
and efficiency, between fairness and economic
productivity. Sixty years ago, Harry Truman
said he would like to have a one-handed economist. Asked why, he said that every economist he met gave him a menu of choices and
not a preferred choice. They would tell him,
“on the one hand, if you adopt this policy
you will get these benefits and costs; on the
other hand, if you adopt another policy then
there are these benefits and costs.” If there

were only one hand, the choice would be clear.
Investing in disadvantaged young children is
one policy where the choice is clear and the
two hands clap together…. The good news for
policymakers is that there is strong evidence
that early environments can be enriched and
that we can offset, in part, the powerful consequences of the accident of birth.
It is thus particularly ironic that the typical argument against devoting more resources to early childhood development is its cost, particularly now in such
harsh budgetary times. But budgets are always tight.
If we cannot afford it now, then when? Not now often
means never. Moreover, if the debate comes down to
just cost, then not making these investments is what is
really costly. The failure to pick up the figurative $100
bills means greater costs in K-12 education, crime and
crime prevention, incarceration, and welfare spending,
as well as reduced opportunities for the success of our
young people.
FAILURE TO CONCEPTUALIZE

L

ike all other investments, the costs of early childhood programs are borne up front, and the benefits
accrue later. It is this initial cost that appears to be the
obstacle to ensuring quality early starts for the children
of Maine. In my opinion, though, the initial cost is not
really the primary obstacle to picking up the figurative
$100 bills lying around. No matter how tight budgets
get, we manage to fund other investments, such as K-12
and higher education, and road maintenance, to name a
few. I believe the problem is that we have a difficult time
imagining the counterfactual, that is, what would occur
if we did things differently, or how things are different
now as a consequence of our previous decisions.
If we do not maintain our roads, we can still use
them for a long time, but we get visible reminders—big
potholes—that something needs to be done. The lack
of investment in early childhood education also creates
big potholes—more spending on special and remedial
education, greater spending on police and corrections,
more drug and crime problems, smaller tax base—but
we are unaware that an important cause of these problems is our insufficient investment in our youngest
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children. To paraphrase a famous line from the movie
Cool Hand Luke (read this with a theatrical drawl),
what we have here is a failure to conceptualize. It is
this failure to conceptualize future counterfactual cost
savings that leads us to believe that the budget is too
tight right now, and investment in our young children
is not an urgent priority.
A fairly well known academic economist, Lee
Hansen at the University of Wisconsin, joked to his
graduate students that “if you can’t measure it, it might
as well not exist.” Unfortunately, there is too large a
grain of truth in this. We do not readily see the benefits
of early childhood education, so in policy discussions
they might as well not exist. Consequently, too much
of our spending goes to costly band-aids—remedial and
special education, corrections, and welfare—rather than
to relatively inexpensive prevention. Given the magnitudes of the costs of these band-aid programs (see Table
1 for examples) prevention only needs to have small
effects to lead to big savings.
Table 1: 	Selected Maine State and

	Local Government Spending
in FY 2005–06
Total

Per Capita

$2,496,584,000

$1,903

Special Education

$282,763,474

$215

Police Protection

$221,288,000

$169

Corrections

$182,639,000

$139

Public Welfare

Source: Special education expenditure is from the Maine
Department of Education. All other data are from the U.S.
Census Bureau.

The net benefits of early education are not readily
seen for two reasons. First, the hazards of inadequate
development in early childhood are latent, that is, not
observed until much later. If the same hazards (probabilities of incarceration, drug abuse) were immediate,
such as providing alcohol to minors, they almost
certainly would be illegal. Second, there is no explicit
exchange of dollars when the latent effects occur.
Thus, the subsequent costs savings in K-12 education
22 · Maine Policy Review · Summer/Fall 2009

and incarceration, for example, would not show up
in an accounting line labeled “returns to investment
in early education.” But this does not make the
returns any more hypothetical or any less real than
if actual dollars were exchanged every time a child
is prevented from repeating a grade or spending time
in detention. Of course, more research quantifying
these difficult-to-measure benefits would help us to
better visualize the counterfactual consequences, but
the primary obstacle is the preoccupation with explicit
monetary transactions. It is the preoccupation with
what is easily measurable that has led to all sorts of
economically inefficient policies, such as allowing
too much environmental degradation. We must hope
that this improves over time with improved ability
to estimate values of things that do not involve market
transactions.
Also contributing to doubts about the payoff from
early childhood interventions is the rather large range
of estimated benefit-cost ratios. The ratios in the case
studies noted above ranged from greater than nine to
less than three. This suggests uncertainty about the
value of the benefits of early education programs.
Actually, the benefit-cost ratios vary not because of
uncertainly about the values of the benefits, but rather
because of which benefits can be measured in each case.
For example, some studies do not measure the value of
the reduction in crime, other studies do not include the
value of better health, some do not include the benefits
that accrue over entire lifetimes, and so on. The lower
range of cost-benefit ratios are mostly due to including
the value of fewer benefits in the calculations. Hence,
the most complete estimates are generally in the upper
range of cost-benefit numbers.
WHY THE PAYOFF IS SO HIGH

P

erhaps another obstacle to making significantly
greater investment in early childhood development is that the purported return is almost too high
to believe. It is like the joke about the two economists who walk past a $100 bill lying on the ground.
Neither will pick it up because a real $100 bill lying
on the ground is just too good to be true. In the case
of investment in the human capital of preschool children, though, there is a straightforward reason for
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the extraordinarily high returns. It has to do with the
nature of human capital accumulation.
The more skills one learns, the easier it becomes
to learn additional skills. As Nobel Prize laureate James
Heckman (2000: 4) has written, “early learning begets
later learning and early success breeds later success.”
Human capital accumulation has a self-productive
aspect. In other words, the production of human capital
is characterized by dynamic complementarity: the impact
of investment in human capital at a particular time in
the life cycle affects, and is affected by, investments in
human capital at other times in the life cycle. This is
analogous to the “miracle of compound interest” with
financial investments, but is considerably stronger in the
case of human capital accumulation, which is why
investing early and often is so important and why the
payoff can be so high. It is also why later investments in
children’s human capital are also important. For far too
many disadvantaged young children, our expensive
investments in their educations are largely ineffective
because of insufficient development in early childhood.
Conversely, greater investments in early childhood investments would be largely ineffective if they come from
substantial cuts in investments in primary, secondary,
and tertiary education (although greater early childhood
investments will lead to later reductions in the costs of
remedial education).
Indeed, the first several years of education, and
presumably preschool, have little direct economic
payoff (for evidence on this, see Trostel 2004;
Heckman, Lochner and Todd 2008). As common sense
would suggest, the payoff from the first years of
schooling is in preparing the student for later years
of schooling, and those years have a direct economic
return (for further discussion on this point, see Cunha
et al. 2006; Cunha and Heckman 2007). Also, for
those falling behind initially it is difficult, even impossible, to catch up. Adverse early childhood experiences
can create a permanent barrier to success in life.
The empirical evidence on the nature of human
capital accumulation suggests that achieving economic
success through education is analogous to climbing a
hill. Imagine biking and being at the bottom of a big
hill. The crucial part of the effort up the hill is where
it starts to get steep. The key to getting through this
tough part where the road turns upward is having and

keeping momentum from the start. If you start from a
standing stop on the steepest part, you are unlikely to
make it up the hill. Thus, it is the beginning that
generates the momentum for the hardest part that is
crucial. Having enough early momentum to get
through the inflection point (where the slope starts to
diminish) makes the rest of the hill relatively easy.
Reaching academic, social, and economic summits is
like this biking example. The production profile of
human capital is shaped like a hill.

For far too many disadvantaged young
children, our expensive investments in
their educations are largely ineffective
because of insufficient development
in early childhood.
There is also empirical evidence on the other side of
the dynamic-complementarity issue. That is, the returns
to early investments in human capital depend
on the extent of later investments. The high returns to
early interventions are contingent on continued investment. To go back to the biking-up-a-hill analogy, although
effort before the steepest part of the hill may be the most
crucial, continued effort all the way up is needed to reach
the summit. Even past the inflection point where the slope
starts becoming less steep, coasting and losing momentum
can still lead to failure. For example, some research has
found that the initial gains in academic achievement tests
from participation in Head Start “faded out” in elementary school because the former Head Start participants
generally attended poorer schools (see Currie and Thomas
2000). Thus, early and sustained investment creates the
compounding effect.
CAVEATS

T

wo important points should be stressed about estimates of the returns to investment in early childhood development.
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First, because of the dynamic complementarity, the
return to early childhood investments is contingent on
later human capital investments. Consequently, the rate
of return at various stages of investment in human
capital is not well defined. The rate of return to investment at a specific stage of human capital accumulation
depends on one’s perspective, that is, on the particular
thought experiment being considered. The return estimated from a preschool intervention, for example,
implicitly holds all else constant, including the quantity
and quality of later schooling. Similarly, the estimated
return for high school or college graduation, for
instance, implicitly holds the quantity and quality of
preschool and primary education constant. But these
stages of education are unlikely to be independent of
each other. So, there is no clear cut way to unambiguously isolate the benefits of a specific stage of educational development. In other words, research studies
examining different stages of preschool or school could
attribute the same benefits (higher earnings and tax
revenues, lower costs of incarceration and welfare) to
different levels of human capital development.

The second, more well-known, caveat about estimated benefits of investment in early childhood development is that almost all the estimates are from
targeted interventions. That is, the estimates are for
children the most at risk for low educational, social,
and economic outcomes. The benefit-cost ratios for
such targeted interventions are surely higher than for
early childhood programs for the broader population.
A far higher proportion of non-at-risk children are
on their way to successful lives without new programs.
It is unclear, however, to what extent the benefit-cost
ratio would be lower for a wide-reaching early childhood program. Karoly and Bigelow (2005), however,
calculated that the returns to a universal preschool
program would not be dramatically less than the
returns to targeted programs. The benefit-cost ratio
in their baseline case, after discounting the future benefits, was 2.6. Thus, as programs for early childhood
development reach a wider population, evidently the
larger the net benefits for society. The policy goal
should not be to achieve the higher benefit-cost ratio,
but rather to undertake all policies with benefit-cost
ratios greater than one.

It is rare that a public policy choice does

CONCLUSION

not present difficult tradeoffs, but greater
investment in young children is such a case.
This has important policy implications, but this
point has been overlooked in the mushrooming literature on the returns to early childhood programs (as
well as in the literature on the returns to high school
and college graduation). The failure to account for the
dynamic complementarity between human capital
investments can misguide policy. The estimated returns
from a specific preschool intervention, which implicitly
hold all else constant, do not generalize for a reallocation of preschool and school funding. The apparent
“fade out” of the benefits of Head Start serves as a good
lesson in this regard. It is important to keep in mind
the specific experiment from which the estimated
returns were derived.
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T

he evidence is steadily mounting that investing
in early childhood development pays in a big way.
It benefits the children for the rest of their lives. It
also benefits society with reduced crime and reduced
government spending in other areas. Moreover, it
benefits society in terms of being the right thing to do
(which clearly has value too). It is rare that a public
policy choice does not present difficult tradeoffs, but
greater investment in young children is such a case.
As I see it, the real obstacle preventing us from
taking advantage of the windfall-profit opportunities of
investing in our young children is the lack of awareness. The cause-and-effect relationships between early
childhood learning and later-life consequences are
underappreciated, and our spending priorities lean too
far toward treating the symptoms rather than on lowcost prevention. In a 2009 press release from the
Highscope Educational Research Foundation, Sanford
Newman, founder of Fight Crime: Invest in Kids, put a
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particularly eloquent point on this: “…we need to be
as willing to guarantee our kids space in a pre-kindergarten program as we are to guarantee a criminal a
prison cell” (www.highscope.org/Content.
asp?ContentId=282). Indeed, we should be more
willing to guarantee our kids quality early childhood
education than later-life band-aids.
Whenever I think about the issue of early childhood investments, I recall the old long-running ad
campaign of a well-known muffler business—where the
mechanic chuckles at the end “well, you can pay me
now, or you can pay me (a lot more) later.” Basic maintenance on a car is an obvious way to prevent expensive
problems later. If only we could see early childhood
development as an obvious way to prevent expensive,
and inequitable, problems later. 
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